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CASE COMMENT
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: DRAWING A NEW CRITICAL LINE
BETWEEN THE STATE'S COMPETING INTERESTS IN
ABORTION REGULATION TO COMPORT WITH
SOCIAL PALPABILITY
Gonazales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007)*
Jason Pil*
On November 5, 2003, President George Bush signed the Partial-Birth
Abortion Ban Act of 2003 (Act),' a federal statute regulating late-term
abortion procedures. 2 The ban on partial-birth abortions regulated the
surgical procedure referred to as "dilation and evacuation" (D&E). 3 In
2004, respondents, abortion doctors, challenged the constitutionality of the
Act and sought an injunction against its enforcement in the U.S. District
Court for the District of Nebraska.4 The district court granted a permanent
injunction banning the enforcement of the Act in all cases except those in
which there was no dispute that the fetus was viable.' The Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the injunction.6 Contemporaneously,
respondents, Planned Parenthood advocacy groups, sought an injunction
of the Act in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
* Editors' Note: This Case Comment received the Huber C. Hurst Award for outstnding
Case Comment in Fall 2007.
** J.D. expected May 2009, University ofFlorida Levin College of Law, B.A. in Economics,
2005 University of Florida. I would like to thank my parents, Jim and Alda, along with my friends
for their continual motivation and support. Also, I send my appreciation to my colleagues on the
University of FloridaJournalof Law & Public Policy for their guidance and hard work.
1. 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2000); Gonzalesv. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1623-24(2007). In 1996,
Congress attempted to ban partial-birth abortions, President Bill Clinton vetoed the legislation, and
the Senate failed to override the veto. Id. at 1623. Congress approved another bill banning the
procedures in 1997, but President Bill Clinton vetoed it again. Id.
2. Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. at 1619. The Act proscribed a particular method of ending fetal life
in the late stage of pregnancy known as the intact dilation and evacuation ("intact D&E") but
permitted the standard dilation and evacuation (standard D&E). See id. at 1620, 1624, 1629. The
Act did not proscribe the more common procedures used in the early stages of pregnancy, when the
majority of abortions take place. Id. at 1620.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 1619.
5. Id.
6. Id.
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California. 7 The district court enjoined the Attorney General from
enforcing the Act.8 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
injunction. 9 Petitioner, the U.S. Attorney General, sought certiorari review
of the judgments from the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Eighth and Ninth
Circuits." In reversing the judgments, the Supreme Court HELD that the
Act was not void for vagueness,"1 did not impose an undue burden on the
mother, 2 proscribed performing only a specific D&E procedure, 3 and was
not overly broad as it provided specific anatomical landmarks to help
determine when doctors violated the Act. 14
The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution grants the right to
privacy, which is derived from the concept of personal liberty. 5 This right
to privacy is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, but the Court has
recognized certain zones of personal privacy that are guaranteed. 6 The
Court determined that this right to privacy encompasses a woman's
decision to terminate her pregnancy. 7 In Roe v. Wade, 18 the foundation of
abortion jurisprudence, the Court detailed a woman's right to terminate her
pregnancy. 9
In Roe, the Court reviewed a decision from the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of Texas reviewing the constitutionality of state
criminal abortion legislation." The plaintiff sought injunctive and

7. Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. at 1619.
8. Id. at 1620.
9. Id.
10. See id. at 1619-20.
11. Id. at 1628.
12. Gonzales, 127 S.Ct. at 1629, 1632.
13. Id. at 1634-35.
14. Id. at 1632.
15. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973). The Court reasoned that a woman has the
right to decide whether or not to terminate a pregnancy, although that right was not absolute. Id.
at 153-54. The Court determined that the right derived from the personal liberties granted by the
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, but noted that the district court determined that
the right was granted by the Ninth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Id. at 153.
16. Id. at 152.
17. Id. at 153.
18. Id.
19. See id. at 163-64.
20. Roe, 410 U.S. at 116. The Texas case reached the Court on federal appeal along with a
companion case from Georgia, Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973). Id. The Texas statute at issue
was typical of statutes previously enacted in many states for over a century. Id. The Texas statute
was first enacted in 1854 and remained substantially unchanged up until the time the case reached
the Supreme Court. Id. at 119. It contained an exception for an abortion by medical advice to save
the life of the mother. Id. Jane Roe, a single woman residing in Texas, instituted a federal action
against the District Attorney seeking a declaratory judgment that the statute was unconstitutional.
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declaratory relief respecting the Texas criminal abortion laws.2' The
district court entered judgment declaring the statutes void, but denying
injunctive relief, prompting both parties to appeal.22
On review, the Court grappled with the two compelling State interests
created by abortion, protecting the health of the pregnant woman and
protecting potential human life.23 The Court reasoned that the interests
were inversely related and that each "grows in substantiality as the woman
and, at a point during pregnancy, each becomes
approaches term
'compelling. "'24 According to the Court, viability is the point at which the
State's interest in potential life becomes compelling.25
At the point of viability, the fetus presumably has the capability of
living outside the womb, making the State's interest in both the mother's
health and the health of the fetus compelling.26 Subsequent to the point of
viability, the State may elect to regulate, and even proscribe, abortions
except where necessary to save the life of the mother.27 The Court's
holding was threefold.28
First, the Court recognized the right of a woman to terminate her
pregnancy before the point of viability without undue interference from the
State.29 Second, the State may restrict and prohibit abortions after the point
of viability, as long as the proscription contains an exception for
pregnancies that endanger the life of the mother.3" Third, the Court
Roe, 410 U.S. at 120. Jane was unmarried and wished to terminate her pregnancy. Id.In contrast,
the Georgia statute reflected a recent attitude change and the advancing medical technology of the
time. Id.at 116. John and Mary Doe resided in Georgia and filed a companion complaint to Roe.
Id. at 121. The District Attorney was named as defendant and the couple sought injunctive relief
declaring the statute unconstitutional. Id.Mary Doe had a "neural chemical" disorder which forced
her to stop using birth control pills. Roe,410 U.S. at 121. Mary was worried that if she got pregnant
she would have to abort the pregnancy. Id. The two actions were consolidated and the district court
held that the Does lacked standing and declared the statutes void. Id.at 121-22.
21. Id.at 121.
22. Id.at 122. The district court held that abstention was warranted with respect to the
injunction. Id.The plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court based on the ruling denying the
injunction, while the defendant cross-appealed from the grant of declaratory relief. Id.
23. Id.at 162.
24. Id.at 162-63.
25. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
26. See id.
27. Id.at 163-64.
28. See id.at 164-65.
29. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (discussing Roe v.
Wade's main holdings). Before the point of viability, the State's interests were not compelling
enough to support a prohibition of abortion or the imposition of substantial obstacles to the
woman's right to terminate her pregnancy. See id.
30. Id.
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recognized the State's compelling interests in protecting the life of the
mother and the health of the fetus; the Court concluded that these interests
do not contradict each other.3'
Analyzing the effects of Roe in PlannedParenthoodv. Casey,3" the
Supreme Court reaffirmed its earlier holding in light of advances in
maternal health and prenatal care.33 The Court granted certiorari for an
action filed by a coalition of abortion clinics and abortion doctors
challenging the constitutionality of a series of provisions in the
Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982.34 The petitioners, the coalition
of abortion clinics and abortion doctors, sought declaratory and injunctive
relief." The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
entered a preliminary injunction. 6 After a bench trial, the court ruled all
the provisions unconstitutional and entered a permanent injunction against
Pennsylvania's enforcement of them.37 The Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit found all of the regulations, except the provision requiring spousal
notification before a woman could have an abortion, constitutional.38 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari 39 and reaffirmed Roe's holding at the
outset by determining that its central rule had neither become unworkable
nor obsolete.4" Acknowledging the opposition41 and emotion4 2 engendered
by Roe, the Court could not find any evolution of legal principle that had
left Roe on any weaker doctrinal footings than when it was decided in
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See id. at 846.
34. Casey, 505 U.S. at 844. The statute contained five provisions which were at issue. Id.
First, a woman seeking an abortion was required to give her informed consent prior to the
procedure, and the statute specified that she receive certain information at least twenty-four hours
in advance of the procedure. Id. Second, a minor seeking an abortion was required to get the
informed consent of one of her parents, unless she obtained a judicial bypass. Id. Third, a married
woman seeking an abortion was required to sign a statement indicating that she had notified her
husband of the abortion, save certain limited exceptions. Id. Fourth, compliance with the three
aforementioned requirements was exempted in the event of a medical emergency. Casey, 505 U.S.
at 844. Fifth, certain reporting requirements were imposed on abortion facilities. Id.
35. Id. at 845.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Casey, 505 U.S. at 845.
40. Id. at 860.
41. Id. at 869 ("Whether or not a new social consensus is developing on that issue, its
divisiveness is no less today than in 1973, and pressure to overrule the decision, like pressure to
retain it, has grown only more intense.").
42. Id.at 850 ("Some of us as individuals find abortion offensive to our most basic principles
of morality, but that cannot control our decision.").

CASE COMMENT

1973. 4 ' Although time had overtaken some of Roe's factual assumptions
because of medical advances, the Court could not find sufficient
justification to overturn the holding." Therefore, overruling Roe would run
contrary to the established principle of stare decisis in the absence of
factual developments making the holding obsolete.45
Similar to Roe, the instant case reached the Court as a consolidation of
cases challenging the constitutionality of an act regulating abortion
procedures.' The Act at issue differentiated two surgical procedures
utilized in the later stages of pregnancy by proscribing the intact D&E
while allowing the standard D&E.47 The Act applied to both previability
and postviability as the Court noted, "a fetus is a living organism while
'
within the womb, whether or not it is viable outside the womb."48

43. Id. at 857.
44. Casey, 505 U.S. at 860. The Court reaffirmed Roe in accordance with stare decisis. Id.
at 870. The Court held that the undue burden test should be used in evaluating abortion restrictions
before viability, id.at 878; the medical emergency provision in the Pennsylvania statute was
sufficiently broad that it did not impose an undue burden, id.at 880; the informed consent
requirements, twenty-four-hour waiting period, parental consent requirement, and reporting
requirements did not impose an undue burden, id. at 885, 887, 889-90; and the spousal notification
created an undue burden and was invalidated, id. at 898.
45. Id. at 864.
46. Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1619 (2007); see supratext accompanying note 4.
47. Id.at 1620-22. The standard D&E procedure involves a doctor initially dilating the cervix
to the extent needed to insert surgical instruments into the uterus. Id. at 1620. After sufficient
dilation, the woman is anesthetized and then the doctor inserts grasping forceps through the
woman's cervix and into the uterus to grab the fetus. Id.at 1621. The doctor is guided by ultrasound
and once the fetus is secured, the doctor begins pulling the fetus out despite friction from the cervix.
Id. The friction causes the fetus to tear apart and the segments of the fetus are pulled out, or
evacuated. Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. at 1621. The evacuation process continues piece by piece until the
fetus has been completely removed. Id. "A doctor may make 10 to 15 passes with the forceps" to
completely remove the fetus. Id. The placenta and any remaining fetal material are then suctioned
or scraped out. Id. The intact D&E procedure which was the impetus for the Act, also begins by
dilating the cervix, sometimes to a higher degree than a standard D&E. Id.The doctor then extracts
the fetus in a method that attempts to remove the entire body, instead of ripping it apart. Gonazales,
127 S. Ct. at 1628. Typically, the head lodges in the cervix, and dilation is insufficient to allow it
to pass. Id. At this point, the particular doctor may elect from a few methods that will ultimately
collapse the head of the fetus, allowing it to pass through the cervix. Id.The Act criminalized intact
D&E while allowing standard D&E. Id.at 1627. For purposes of criminal liability, the overt act of
causing the fetus' death must be distinct from delivery. Id.at 1627-28. The Act does not proscribe
procedures which involve the delivery of an expired fetus. Gonazales, 127 S. Ct. at 1627-28. The
Act includes a scienter requirement in the event that a doctor planning to perform a standard D&E
is forced to perform an intact D&E. Id.at 1628. These two D&E procedures represent
approximately .07% of the second trimester abortions. Id. at 1623.
48. Id. at 1627.
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The Court began its opinion by applying the Casey standard, which
maintained the essential holding from Roe, that the government had a
legitimate and substantial interest in preserving potential life.49 The
analysis was guided by Casey's balance between the competing interest of
a woman's right to choose to terminate her pregnancy and the protection
of the fetus.5" The Court noted that upholding the judgments from the
lower courts, which had found the Act unconstitutional, would repudiate
the central premise from Casey;5 accordingly, the Court upheld the Act.52
In reversing the lower courts' judgment, the Court was not persuaded by
the respondents' claim that the Act was void for vagueness or that the
Act's lack of a health exception 5imposed
an undue burden on a woman's
3
right to terminate her pregnancy.
The Court's analysis began by establishing that the Act was not void
54
for vagueness based on the anatomical landmarks stipulated in the Act,
and that the scienter requirement prevented arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement by limiting prosecutorial discretion." Based on the scienter
requirement, a doctor who removed the fetus in pieces, or a doctor who
intended to remove the fetus in pieces from the outset, was not affected by
the Act. 6 The opinion next examined whether the Act put a "substantial
obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus
attains viability,""
by examining the holding from Roe, as reaffirmed by
58
Casey.

To better analyze the burden created by the Act, the Court reviewed the
statutory text and Congress's rationale in differentiating the two D&E
procedures that occurred during the same stage of pregnancy.59 Although
Congress had found the intact D&E more inhumane and wished to
proscribe it, the two D&E procedures both occurred in the later stages of

49. Id.at 1626.
50. Id.at 1626-27.
51. Gonzales, 127 S.Ct. at 1626.
52. Id. at 1639.
53. Id.
54. Id.at 1627.
55. Id.at 1629.
56. Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. at 1628-29. To impose criminal liability, a prosecutor has to
demonstrate that the doctor performing an intact D&E met the scienter requirement. Id.at 1628.
The scienter requirement alleviated the vagueness that the respondents had argued. Id.
The scienter
requirement also ensured that the doctors had minimal guidelines to govern their behavior and
avoided placing complete discretion in the hands of law enforcement. Id.at 1629.
57. Id.
at 1632 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992)).
58. Id.at 1633-34.
59. Id. at 1632-34.
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pregnancy and could not be distinguished by the established point of
viability.6" Because the point of viability was not workable for Congress's
objective of specifically banning one of the D&E procedures, 6' Congress
differentiated the intact D&E from the standard D&E by stating that the
landmark so that the
fatal act had to occur after delivery to an anatomical
62
fetus was partially "outside... the mother.,
Ultimately, the Act proscribed the intact D&E based on the fetus's
anatomical location, mollifying Congress's concerns that approving such
a brutal procedure would coarsen society to the humanity of newborns and
make it increasingly difficult to protect human life.63 On review, the Court
found that the Act furthered the State's legitimate interest in protecting
human life and noted, "the State may use its regulatory power to bar
certain procedures and substitute others."' Echoing Congress's rationale,
the Court was more concerned with the "infanticide" 65 characteristics of
the intact D&E and less concerned with the stage of pregnancy during
which the procedure was performed, because both D&E procedures were
performed postviability. 66 The Court noted that proscribing the intact D&E
was an attempt by Congress to draw "a bright line that clearly
distinguishes abortion and infanticide." 67 Thus, the Act was found valid,
even though it proscribed one abortion procedure and permitted a similar
procedure that occurred in the same stage of pregnancy, because Congress
and the Court found that the proscribed procedure had additional ethical
and moral implications that the legal procedure did not have.68
The dissent criticized the majority opinion for blurring a bright-line
rule established in Roe, and reaffirmed by Casey.69 The Roe decision used
the point of viability as the compelling point at which to balance the
State's competing interests because it was found to have "both logical and

60. Id. at 1633-34.
61. Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. at 1633-34.
62. Id. at 1630 (citing 18 U.SC. § 1531 (2000).
63. Id. at 1632-33 (citing Congressional Findings (14)(N) in notes following 18 U.S.C. §
1531 (2000 ed., Supp. IV), at 769).
64. Id. at 1633.
65. Id. at 1633-34.
66. Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. at 1633-35.
67. Id. at 1633-34.
68. Id. at 1633 ("D&E is a procedure itself laden with the power to devalue human life.
Congress could nonetheless conclude that the type of abortion proscribed by the Act requires
specific regulation because it implicates additional ethical and moral concerns that justify a special
prohibition.").
69. Id. at 1650 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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biological justifications. ' 70 However, the Court in the instant case applied
the Act to both previability and postviability cases, a departure from the
bright-line rule of Casey.7' Justice Ginsburg referred to Congress's
purpose to differentiate the two procedures not based on the established
line of viability, but rather on where a "fetus is anatomically located when
a particular medical procedure is performed ' 72 and a subjective and
moralistic decision between "abortion and infanticide."73
The instant Court departs from viability, the scientifically established
critical point when the State's interest in potential life becomes
compelling. This decision effectively blurs the line that the Casey Court
found valid despite the passing of twenty years since deciding Roe.74 The
Casey Court affirmed Roe based on stare decisis and the lack of any
factual findings that made the ruling obsolete, stating that "[a]ny judicial
act of line-drawing may seem somewhat arbitrary, but Roe was a reasoned
statement, elaborated with great care."75 The point of viability was found
to have "an element of fairness. ' 76 The Court firmly stated "there is no line
other than viability which is more workable. '77 The Casey Court struggled
to find legitimate justification to overrule Roe beyond public sentiment
that the case was wrongly decided.7 8 The Court stated that the soundness
of the constitutional judgment was not altered by the passing of time or by
medical advances that allowed the point of viability to be attained earlier
in pregnancy.79 Ultimately, overruling Roe would have addressed error,

70. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
71. See Gonzales, 127 S.Ct. at 1627; see also id.
at 1650 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
72. Id.at 1650 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting).
73. Id.
74. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992); see also Stenberg
v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 946 (2000) (affirming a lower court's judgment that a ban on partial birth
abortions was unconstitutional). The Sternberg Court noted that because the Nebraska statute at
issue applied to previability and postviability, this "aggravates the constitutional problem
presented" and the State's interest in regulating abortions is significantly weaker postviability than
previability. Id. at 930; see also Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S 52, 63-64
(1976). Affirming a portion of a Missouri abortion statute which utilized the term "viability" as its
compelling point, but did not state a specific number of weeks at which viability occurred, the
DanforthCourt recognized that viability was a medical judgment left to doctors and maintained the
flexibility of the term while affirming Roe. Danforth,428 U.S. at 72-74.
75. Casey, 505 U.S. at 870.
76. Id.

77. Id.
78. See id.
at 869.
79. Id.at 860.
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and such a decision would unnecessarily
damage the Court's legitimacy
80
and its commitment to stare decisis.
In the instant case, the Court failed to posit any significant medical
advances or attack the underpinnings of the Roe decision when it shifted
the focus away from the objective point of viability.8 ' Instead the Court
reiterated Congress's concerns over the brutality of intact D&E 82 and
blurred a line established by Roe, and reaffirmed by Casey. Since Roe,
viability has served as the critical point to best balance the State's
competing interests.83 However, the instant Court focused on the "brutal
and inhumane procedure"84 and essentially differentiated the two D&E
procedures by the anatomical location of the fetus, 85 a far cry from the
clarity established by the point of viability. By focusing on a procedure
subjectively deemed more offensive than another, the Court differentiated
the two procedures with little concern for the point of viability. The Court
created a new critical point to comport with the social palatability of the
procedures and further Congress's objective of drawing a bright line
between "abortion and infanticide."86 Both procedures are performed
during the third trimester, and both effectively terminate pregnancy.
However, the Court established a new critical point, based on a fetus's
anatomical position, for assessing the constitutionality of the Act.
The wake of the Gonzales decision will be felt in future abortion cases
as the once bright-line rule of viability has been blurred by undue
emphasis on the brutality of an abortion procedure. This shift away from
the point of viability will grant more discretion to courts and to Congress
in future abortion issues. The new standard allows for a stronger focus on
a subjective perception of brutality or inhumanity of a procedure, as
opposed to an objective scientific time frame. The distinguishing
characteristic of the fetus' anatomical location is a political and judicial
construct to differentiate between two procedures in a way that the point
of viability would not allow. Congress, with the Court's subsequent
approval, created the concept of the fetus' anatomical location to bypass
the established point of viability, thus blurring a bright line, and
significantly weakening the foundation created by Roe and Casey. As
advocacy groups continue to challenge the controversial issue of abortion

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Casey, 505 U.S. at 868-69.
See Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1634-35 (2007).
Id. at 1633-34.
Cf id. at 1649-50 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1633.
Id. at 1634-35.
Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. at 1633-34.
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regulation, the jurisprudence will lack certainty because the Court
demonstrated that the fixed point of viability can be bypassed.

